WANG Hua. Analysis of Shareholder Supervision Based on the Ecnomics Game[J]. Journal of Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute, 2007, 19(2): 91-94. DOI: 10.13681/j.cnki.cn41-1282/tv.2007.02.038
    Citation: WANG Hua. Analysis of Shareholder Supervision Based on the Ecnomics Game[J]. Journal of Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute, 2007, 19(2): 91-94. DOI: 10.13681/j.cnki.cn41-1282/tv.2007.02.038

    Analysis of Shareholder Supervision Based on the Ecnomics Game

    • Game analysis of shareholder supervision indicates that there are many dynamics game processes during different stages in major shareholders and minor ones when supervising the managers.Because of the "public commodity" feature,the shareholders lack supervision of the managers,which makes shareholders follow the successful ones.And this lack will weaken when the share right is concentrated.When the share right is concentrated properly,and major shareholders initiatively supervise the managers,the major shareholders will seize the minor shareholders’ right.In order to protect minor shareholders and make major shareholders successful,meanwhile forming the powerful supervision system we must strength the supervision and management of major shareholders.
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