HAO Di-jing. Salary Management of State-owned Enterprises Based on Incentive Theory[J]. Journal of Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute, 2012, 24(3): 102-104. DOI: 10.13681/j.cnki.cn41-1282/tv.2012.03.025
    Citation: HAO Di-jing. Salary Management of State-owned Enterprises Based on Incentive Theory[J]. Journal of Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute, 2012, 24(3): 102-104. DOI: 10.13681/j.cnki.cn41-1282/tv.2012.03.025

    Salary Management of State-owned Enterprises Based on Incentive Theory

    • In the modern market economy, salary management has a significant impact on the competitiveness of enterprises. This paper analyzes the problems of salary management of state-owned enterprises: lack of strategic orientation, lack of external competitiveness of the salary level, lack of perfect compensation assessment system, to explore the salary management of state-owned enterprises on the incentive theory and give the five main strategies to perfect the salary management of state-owned enterprises: design the salary strategy effectively, ensure the external competitive ability of the salary level, set up a scientific assessment system, improve the skills of salary management, make scientific use of the salary management art.
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